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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )	
5	vs. ) Criminal Action	
6	DEBRA MULLOY, ) No. 18-10200-FDS	
7	Defendant ) )	
8	)	
9		
10	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE F. DENNIS SAYLOR, IV	
11	SENTENCING	
12	SENTENCTING	
13		
14	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
15	Courtroom No. 2 One Courthouse Way	
16	Boston, MA 02210	
17	December 12, 2018	
18	3:00 p.m.	
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23	Valerie A. O'Hara Official Court Reporter	
24	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse 1 Courthouse Way, Room 3204	
25	Boston, MA 02210 E-mail: vaohara@gmail.com	

APPEARANCES: For The United States: United States Attorney's Office, by MARK J. BALTHAZARD, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 1 Courthouse Way, Suite 9200, Boston, Massachusetts 02110; For the Defendant: Dwyer LLC, by THOMAS E. DWYER, JR., ESQ., and JONATHAN C. CRAFTS, ESQ., 10 Derne Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02114. 

1 PROCEEDINGS THE CLERK: All rise. Thank you. Please be seated. 2 Court is now in session in the matter of United States vs. 3 Debra Mulloy, Criminal Action Number 18-10200. 4 Would counsel please identify themselves for the 5 6 record. MR. BALTHAZARD: Good afternoon, your Honor, 7 Mark Balthazard on behalf of the United States. 8 9 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 03:00PM 10 MR. DWYER: Your Honor, Thomas Dwyer on behalf of the 11 defendant, Debra Mulloy, who is seated to my right. 12 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 1.3 MR. CRAFTS: Your Honor, Jonathan Crafts representing 14 the defendant, Debra Mulloy. 15 THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is the sentencing of 16 Debra Mulloy. I've received and read the pre-sentence report as revised through October 23rd, the plea agreement, the 17 18 defendant's sentencing memorandum, which had multiple 19 attachments, including letters from family members and 03:01PM 20 supporters, and the government's sentencing memorandum filed November 1st. 21 Is there anything else I should have seen that I have 22 23 not? Mr. Balthazard. 24 MR. BALTHAZARD: No, your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Mr. Dwyer.

1 MR. DWYER: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Dwyer, I know you've had an 2 opportunity to review the pre-sentence report. Have you gone 3 over it with the defendant? 4 MR. DWYER: Yes, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Mulloy? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Mr. Balthazard, are there any victims who 8 9 wish to be participate in the proceeding? 03:01PM 10 MR. BALTHAZARD: Yes, your Honor, I'm sorry, I meant to ask when you listed the items that have been reviewed that 11 12 the victim impact statement was attached to the PSR. 1.3 THE COURT: I'm actually not sure I saw it. Do you 14 have a copy of it? Does the victim wish to speak? 15 MR. BALTHAZARD: The victim also wishes to speak. 16 victim impact statement had been submitted to the probation 17 office, and if the Court has not --18 THE COURT: Let me take a look at it because I don't 19 think I've seen it, and then what I will do is I'm going to go 03:02PM 20 through the objections and the PSR, the quideline calculation, 21 and then at that point before argument and elocution, we'll let 22 the victim speak. 23 MR. BALTHAZARD: It's been redacted, your Honor, in 24 case it had been made public with the identification of the victim to be redacted. 25

THE COURT: All right. I've read the victim impact statement. Let me turn next to the objections. There were, I think to the extent that there were objections in the pre-sentence report, they've been addressed in one way or another, either through amendment of the report or calling certain facts to my attention.

In the defendant's memorandum, I think there are also objections to certain guideline enhancements. Do you want to be heard on that, Mr. Dwyer, vulnerable victim and so forth?

MR. DWYER: Well, I was, if this is the most appropriate time.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. DWYER: Just give me one minute, if you may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DWYER: The government has proposed to the probation department, and they have adopted the vulnerable victim enhancement.

Now, I think if you look at the First Circuit cases, primarily with respect to setting forth the affirmative standard that must be met as well as the four or five cases that were affirmed in the nature of those four or five cases where people were elderly patients, there was age and physical problems, I think that the standard -- and they were disabled, somebody, an accountant was taking money away from somebody in the 80's, I think if you look at the First Circuit cases, I

think it makes abundantly clear that those standards, those cases, the language of the guidelines, the commentary section with respect to the guidelines cannot in any way support the proposition of vulnerable victim.

Vulnerable victim we look at two ways: One, what was the status of the person who was the victim when the fraud began? Now, if you look at the status and you take Mr. this is one of the most pronounced, decorated, awarded interior designers in the entire country, and that was his role at that time, and he has never changed that role.

He does projects here, New England, all over the country, Florida, I think Colorado, all over the country, so if you look, first of all, at Day One, the first day that my client uses the credit card on Newbury Street to buy a bracelet, on that Day One, the only relationship between her is as an employee, and he is an owner. He is not what they used to call in other litigation a protected class, in my opinion.

He is not, in my judgment, falls within the standard of the First Circuit, elderly, infirmed, et cetera, and so I've briefed this longer than I should have briefed it in our memo, but I think it captures the fact that his status, even if he lost his partner a year before, his status is different.

My client wasn't dealing with credit cards until a year after his partner died, and there's an allegation in here that sets up the scenario that we're dealing with grief, and

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the grief, for the 12 months of grief is somehow turned this national interior design person into a vulnerable person for which my client takes advantage.

MR. BALTHAZARD: I think the record is clear both in the PSR and in Mr. 's victim impact statement that he was not involved at all in the financial aspects of the business. I don't dispute what Mr. Dwyer had to say about his -- the other aspects of the business, the design aspects of it but that he left all of the financial aspects of the business to his then late husband, that when his husband died, one, he was appropriately devastated and not paying attention to the business, and that Ms. Mulloy took the opportunity to offer to take on those financial parts of the business, which she did, which put her in a position to be able to commit these crimes and to steal, take more than two and a half million dollars from the business.

Based on that, she knew that at the time that he was vulnerable, vulnerability being no interest and no focus at all on the financial end, and she knew about that, and she also knew how he felt having just lost his husband, so she took advantage of those factors to put herself in a position to commit these crimes, and she did.

It would be entirely appropriate for the Court to conclude that he was a vulnerable victim and that this

1 enhancement applies. MR. DWYER: Could I take ten seconds? 2 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Dwyer. 3 MR. DWYER: There's not one case in the United States 4 5 of America that supports the proposition that was just 6 annunciated by Mr. Balthazard. THE COURT: All right. You had another objection I 7 think as well to the guideline calculation, Mr. Dwyer, 8 9 financial hardship? MR. DWYER: Well, waive that. I was going to say to 03:10PM 10 11 you at the outset, I meant to say we have waived financial 12 hardship, and the only other argument we have now or whatever 13 point you wish is on the value of the loss. It is our position 14 that the guideline at 26 far exceeds the value of the loss, and 15 our view is that whether you look at post-Booker or you don't 16 look at post-Booker, that this sum of money is extraordinarily 17 high for a sentence of 63 months, of course, putting aside --18 THE COURT: I think I'll let you make that argument, 19 but I think that's not a guideline argument, in other words, 03:11PM 20 the loss I think is not disputed of \$2.6 million, which fits 21 into this category. 22 MR. DWYER: I have no objection to that. 23 THE COURT: All right. So let me rule on the one objection then. I think this could probably go either way, and 24

so as a matter of prudence, I'm not going to apply the

two-level enhancement for vulnerable victim. I think there is certainly a good argument that as a grieving person, an older person, a person who the defendant knew was not involved with or attentive to the financial aspects of the business would qualify, but in order to avoid any appellate issue in that regard, I'm not going to apply the enhancement, so I will uphold that, and I think that takes care of the objections, if I understand it.

So let me turn to the guideline calculation. The base offense level is 7, there's a 16-level enhancement for the loss amount of \$2.6 million, a two-level enhancement for a substantial financial hardship and a two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of private trust. That brings us to a level 27 with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility with the third level on government motion.

Mr. Balthazard, does the government so move?

MR. BALTHAZARD: That's correct, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: All right. That motion is granted, so that gives us a level 24. The criminal history category is O, the criminal history category is I, and that produces, as I understand the way this works under the statute, the guideline range is 51 to 63 months, but Count 3, which is aggravated identity theft, is two years on top of that; am I correct?

MR. DWYER: Yes, your Honor.

PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: So that's the guideline range. The supervised release range is 1 to 3 years, although Count 3 has a one-year maximum. The fine range is \$25,000 to a little more than \$10,600,000, the restitution amount is \$2,654.346.95, and there's a special assessment of \$100 on each count for a total of \$300.

Is there any additional objection or correction to

Is there any additional objection or correction to that calculation not previously raised? Yes.

PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, the fine would be 20,000, not 25,000 with the change.

THE COURT: 20,000, thank you.

MR. DWYER: I have no objection.

MR. BALTHAZARD: No, your Honor, none.

THE COURT: All right. So that's the guideline framework, and why don't we now have the victim elocution.

Mr. Balthazard.

VICTIM STATEMENT: Judge Saylor, I know that you have reviewed my victim impact statement and are certainly familiar with the elements of the case, so what I would like to do today is give you a little personal input into my life history and to help you better understand why the devastation that this woman caused me has been so effective.

At this point in my life, I've come to realize that a lot of the lessons we learn as children really form the people that we become. And as an example of that, growing up in the

50's as a gay kid was tough.

My father discovered early on that I was more interested in arts and crafts than baseball. He decided to turn his back on me and focus on my brother.

When his friends would make comments like, "There's the neighborhood pansy," it was hard for him, and it was very hard for me.

One positive element in this whole sort of dismal period of my life was my mom. My mom was always there. She always had my corner. She always had my back. I would come home from school hopelessly blue after being bullied by the other kids and she would comfort me.

She would turn to me and say, "You're terrific," and that was the kind of enthusiasm that I needed to go forward and go through it for another day.

The lesson I learned early in life is that while guys often can be competitive, your best friend more typically will be a woman. Your biggest cheerleader, your biggest supporter. I've lived that lesson all my life, and I've supported it and believed in it, and, frankly, until now, it's been true.

When Lee died, we had been together for 32 years, I was devastated, not so much because of the terrible, painful death he experienced, but for the first time in my life, I realized I really was alone.

When he was sick, he would often turn to me and say,

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"When I die, I worry who will look out for you." And I was truly totally alone, no family, no one really to turn to.

Within weeks of Lee's death, Debbie approached me, and she said, "You know, I could do a lot more for you, I could help you work with the business." This was a Godsend to me.

When Lee and I started our business, our arrangement was that he would handle the business side of Bierly, Drake, and I would work with clients in design, and it was a wonderful relationship, but what it meant, I didn't know a lot about the nuts and bolts and the mechanics of running a business, so when Debbie made this offer, I was thrilled, I was overenjoyed, and I felt huge gratitude.

It was at a time when Lee had died, and so I had to contact my attorneys, again, a woman who I think is terrific, and I said I have to do a will because Lee's died, and I sat with Mary, and we talked about it, and I said, you know, I think I would like to have Debbie be my executor, and maybe she should be in charge of my living will.

And then this incredible sort of feeling of gratitude, I made her sole beneficiary of my estate, which just seemed a logical thing because here I was, again, with a woman who had come into my life, and she was going to help me get through a terrible time, and that's what she had volunteered to do.

I couldn't get over the personality change with Debbie and Michael. All of a sudden, they were warm and friendly,

invite me for dinner, they'd invite me on outings, and unlike anything I had experienced, but it was a total personal change, and I was ready to embrace it because it seemed like the logical sort of step in my life, and I did.

Little did I know that this was the beginning of a carefully devised scheme that would, had it continued, have destroyed me totally and the business that I spent my entire life to build.

This evil person recognized that she uncovered the perfect victim, delighted to hand over the reins of my life, and she could now exploit this for personal gain.

Almost immediately she started lobbying to replace our accountant, Andy Hall, who was an old friend, had been one of Lee's pallbearers and had helped us form our business. She said he had become lazy and complacent and really was too expensive and we really should find someone else, so I exceeded, and little did I realize this was probably, if there was one profound, stupid thing you do in your life, this was it because going forward, Debbie had no supervision, as she could do whatever she wanted to do. No one was checking the books, no one was reviewing information, as we went monthly, as Andy had done, and she had a total free reign. She could wreak havoc on a trusting sole.

She started on a small scale with minor charges that really went unnoticed. From there, her hunger grew, and in the

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end amounted to millions that she squandered on frivolous purchases to feed her expanding ego.

These funds would have given her aging boss, which is me, a retirement. It also would have helped her coworkers get raises and bonuses, which they truly deserved, but this was her opportunity to grab the brass ring. She spent millions on fashion and jewelry. She became a philanthropist, the American Heart Association, with money that she stole from the business.

She basically plundered Bierly, Drake and also at a time that we may or may not remember was very tough on the economy. We were having a hard enough time as it was. Her hunger was insatiable.

When I found out one day that her only transportation was a pickup truck, I thought, gee, you know, I am so grateful to Debbie for what she's done for me, and wouldn't it be great if she had a car if she wanted to go out to dinner with Michael or go to a party, she could go in a car instead of a truck, so I gifted her a car.

And true to form, from that point on, every single expense incurred on that car was charged to the business.

These were big expenses, repairs, maintenance but also weekly gas fill-ups were always accompanied by a trip to Dunkin' Donuts. I didn't realize you could spend that much money at Dunkin' Donuts.

At this point, our statements were diverted from the

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office, so even if I had had a sense of wanting to research this, I couldn't have done it. Also, she transferred money from our bank, the Northmark Bank, to our line of credit to cover her tracks, and I now personally stand to owe Northmark Bank \$300,000, which I am personally committed for because of these efforts.

I find it interesting that in the two years since all this horror has come to light, Debbie has never displayed the slightest sense of remorse for her crimes, not to me, not to the company, not to her coworkers.

Her offer of cooperation, I find amusing. It was made after her guilty plea, and, obviously, intended to make people look upon her more favorably.

Her deposition was interesting. It was a litany of unfounded charges against coworkers somehow suggesting that because her coworkers were stealing on a minor level, this somehow exonerated her, and then we heard about the stores fed her wine and cheese, and somehow that was their doing, and that's why she went ahead and spent millions of dollars.

In conclusion, Judge Saylor, today I stand before you.

Tomorrow is my 74th birthday. I work very hard to keep my

business going because it's all I know and because I will never

be able to be retire. I offer think of Lee Bierly.

Lee was a larger than life personality. He captivated everyone he met. When the cancer came, the pain, the

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repetitive pain started to break his spirit. In the end, pancreatic cancer broke Lee. In the end, Debra Mulloy broke me.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. All right. With that, let me hear first from the government as to its recommendation.

Mr. Balthazard.

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MR. BALTHAZARD: Yes, your Honor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government recommends that Ms. Mulloy be sentenced to a term of incarceration at the low end of the range as calculated by the Court, which would be 51 months plus the mandatory 24 months for the aggravated identity theft, in addition that she be ordered after serving her sentence to serve three years of supervised release, pay restitution of \$2,654,346.95. The government in light of that does not recommend any fine and that she be ordered to pay the \$300 special assessment.

Clearly, this is a lengthy sentence that's being recommended, but in the government's view, this is both reasonable and necessary. Starting with the seriousness of the offense, as the Court has seen and heard, the amount of the loss in this case was very substantial, more than two and a half million dollars. It was a crime committed over a long period of time, a number of years, repeated acts of criminal conduct, repeated acts of stealing these funds. You've heard

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the impact that this has had on the business, on Mr. and on their employees.

I anticipate, and we've heard Mr. Dwyer will be arguing that the loss in some way overstates the seriousness of the offense or Ms. Mulloy's culpability. It appears to me that the loss accurately reflects the seriousness of the offense and the culpability.

This was a crime in which she controlled how much she took. She used the credit card, and she charged on it for whatever she wanted to the extent that she thought she could get away with, and that was entirely her decision.

The amount of the loss and what the guidelines reflect is exactly appropriate as far as the seriousness and the culpability. I point out, again, if there's an argument with respect to the guidelines and how that's -- whether the ranges are appropriate or whether the loss tables are inappropriate for some reason, that the guideline tables several years ago were readjusted, and, in fact, had she committed this crime several years earlier and been prosecuted, she would be in a range where the loss tables, she'd actually be a couple of levels higher than under the current guidelines that apply today.

I think it's also clear from the record that she only stopped because she thought she was going to be caught, and that's why she quit the job. There's no reason to think that

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had she not thought that the jig was up and she had to leave that she wouldn't have continued to do this, wouldn't have continued to take money until the business ultimately had to go out of business, until they went bust and Mr.

She did nothing to mitigate the crimes that she committed. When she thought she was going to be caught, she quit, but she didn't only quit, she went into the business, she took records, she took books, removed them, destroyed them, which meant that the victim, Mr. \_\_\_\_\_, the company, they had to hire forensic accountants to figure out what she had done, how much she had taken, how she did it, tried to reconstruct missing business records, and then when time went on, rather than taking the items that she had purchased and perhaps returning them or making them available so that they could be sold and paid some kind of restitution, instead, she apparently donated them, which meant that the victim in this case would get nothing out of all of the items that she had bought using his money.

She's paid no restitution. You heard from Mr. She's done nothing in connection with the civil case other than appear for a deposition and essentially point fingers at other people as an excuse.

With respect to the aggravated identity theft,
Mr. Dwyer in his sentencing memo has said that or suggested

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there's something inappropriate about the government bringing this kind of charge.

I'd suggest that it's not really a close call in this case. She used another person's identification to carry out the crime. It served to help avoid detection. By using another card, it might have enabled her to point a finger at the person whose named on the card, both to avoid detection and make it more difficult to show that she was the one that committed the crimes.

Ultimately, it didn't turn out that way, but by using the card, using somebody else's identification, it had that possibility, and it also could have impacted on the card owner's credit had the bills not been paid.

She abused the trust. We heard how much Mr. trusted her, that he made her not only an executor but a beneficiary, sole beneficiary of his will. Mr. Dwyer argues in his memorandum that her actions appear to defy logic but not really.

I think it is unusual in this case that she didn't seem to take the money and use it to line her pockets or to put it in bank accounts, but clearly she had a purpose, which appears to have been solely primarily to hurt Mr. for reasons that are not at all clear.

It's stated in the memorandum that she perceived that he had been abusive to her, to other employees, that there were

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slights against her, and I use the word "perceive" because there is no evidence that, in fact, that's the case, and I note in the PSR similar claims with respect to later jobs that she had.

In particular, I'm looking at paragraph 65 through 69 of the PSR, so after she left Mr. Drake's employ, she went to work for another company, quit it, she claimed, because the owner was verbally abusive, then she went to another firm, where it's reflected that poor attendance, and abandoned her employment without any notice, and wouldn't consider rehiring her, and she worked for a cleaning company, quit because she disliked cleaning, worked for another company, was "weird."

So I'd suggest that the only slights were apparently in Ms. Mulloy's head. Objectively, this all rings untrue, as the Court has heard. She worked there for many, many years. She was well paid. She had a good salary. She received bonuses. She got increased responsibility. She went to Mr. and said I'd like to help you out and work more on the finances, and he gave her that responsibility, both because he needed the help but because he trusted her.

And, again, she became the beneficiary of the will, the healthcare proxy. There's no reason objectively to look at this and to say that she was slighted or that she had been abused, and, in any event, had she been, the answer is walk away from the job, quit, go find something else.

That wasn't what she chose to do. Instead, she chose to impose severe financial harm on Mr. and his company, and she got away with it because of the incredible trust he had in her.

When she said to him that they were having problems with their accounts, with cash flow and needed more money, he gave it to her, and he believed her reasons that customers were not paying fully, they weren't coming through with what they owed in a timely manner.

Instead of hiring an accountant to check the books and figure out what's going on here, he didn't because he trusted her, and for what, so that she could spend money, millions of dollars buying high end goods at boutiques, clothing and accessories, so much that she didn't even use all of it.

She appeared to just want to make herself out to be a big shot at these boutiques where she was treated like royalty because she was coming in there spending like she was the queen.

And as Mr. pointed out, she's expressed no remorse. There's no sense of remorse in the PSR, there's no sense of remorse in the sentencing memorandum. It just attacked Mr. really, went on and on about all the awful things he had done to her and how she had been mistreated.

Now, I know Mr. Dwyer will say that he wrote the memo and it's all him, but the attitudes that come through in the

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sentencing memorandum are clearly based on what the defendant told him and what her views were.

There's nothing about her personal history or characteristics that suggest any more lenient sentence in this case. Any modest good works she performed are far outweighed by the crimes she committed, not suggesting there's a need for specific deterrence in this case, there's clearly a need in addition to the other factors, a need for general deterrence.

Employees steal from their employers far too often.

The amount here is exceptional. A significant sentence is also needed in order to send a message of deterrence to others, and those are the reasons for the government's recommendation, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dwyer.

MR. DWYER: First of all, your Honor, I want to apologize for asking the Court to continue from the last hearing because I was ill-disposed.

I'm going to kind of go off my prepared script and address a couple things right away. First of all, while there are inferences or more than inferences in our sentencing memorandum about the toxic atmosphere at that firm, I want to make abundantly clear at this point that there's no relationship between that and the misconduct by my client.

This is not a but for situation where but for that chaos, she would not have stolen the money. This is not a

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situation where, although it is perceived in the papers, I think primarily because of the levity of the government's position, this is not a case where she stole the money because she hated

This is in my judgment based upon my 38 years in the game, it is in my judgment where a woman went to a shop on Newbury Street, saw the big time purchases, realized she could do it herself, she went back to two stores and did it, and she took the product, put it into bags into her house until after she left the firm.

I have sought to figure out what the pathology is behind all of that, and I have been unable to figure it out. I think it's clearly some type of personality disorder, but in essence it is she stole the money, so it had to be greed or essence that she stole the money.

Now, to go to Mr. 's point, you know, to get respect for it, to go to Mr. 's point, there is no question that she violated the trust, and she is being penalized for that in the sentence calculation, but there's also no question that she was recently sued by Mr. a highly competent lawyer, who's one of the amata of lawyers that are in the back here representing Mr. and she was sued, and she was asked to come in and talk to counsel, and she went in for four or five hours and talked to counsel and expressed her sorrow for not doing it and explained in detail how it came

about.

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She did not at any point during that dialogue, and half of it was a transcript, she did not in any way, manner, or form blame anyone else but herself, but what she did do was because the plaintiff lawyer knew she had no money, she's in a negative net worth, they weren't interested in her, what they were interested is this, they were interested in the two stores that she went to because they felt that in both of those stores, the owners and salespeople facilitated the fraudulent use of the credit card.

Now, as it turns out, that's what happened, and it turns out that's what she said at the interview, that's what she said in the two-hour transcript, and that's what she said in the four- or five-hour deposition last Friday.

Now, you can't reconcile, you cannot reconcile the fact that 100 percent of the factor is she wants to hurt the firm and the fact that she's helping the firm. Without her assistance, your Honor, will collect nothing on this lawsuit, which was why I urged you, although there is not an abundant of law on this point, as I've discovered, urged you that when you are considering the cooperation component here, which you are entitled to consider under 1553, I think it is, even if there's no 5K1, that because you have a restitution element in your upcoming order that that assistance to lawyers will go against the restitution order, as we can

imagine.

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I'm sorry, I never get it right, 3553, that will go against the restitution, so I'm saying even without this and with this, there is a link between her cooperation. This idea, I mean, Mr.

The idea that she blamed other people is ridiculous. That never happened. Her lawyer was asked, was there anyone else that stole money there, and she says yeah, A, B, C, D stole money, this is why they did, she never backed off of what she stole.

So she admitted every 20 seconds that she had committed the crime, and every 120 seconds, she offered to cooperate. Now, that is why I think that under the cooperation issue that you're entitled to consider under -- let me see if I can get it right this time -- 18 U.S.C., 3553, you're entitled to consider that under the case law and under the practice. You're not required to do anything, but you're entitled to consider whether or not the level of cooperation.

Now, you're also entitled to consider under the case law and this First Circuit particularly, you're also entitled to consider that, what, two four-hour sessions between my client and the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Now, during that my client talked about these two stores and these people at these two stores, but I fully understand why, you know, the Department of Justice wasn't

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going to take more time to chase down a couple of people in stores, but she did, in fact, relay that information, and under the First Circuit, I'm not talking about a large points for it, but I do suggest that it's worth considering on the fact of the cooperation.

She did instantly -- I talked to Mr. Balthazard before the clothes were out of the house of the FBI raid and went in to see him or called him right away. She was in the office, I think within a week, ten days making a proffer, and she was back showing the FBI agents all the detail about all the records.

And the idea that she scurried out of the firm with a lot of the records, she had firm records, which we put into a carton and returned to the civil lawyer that was on this case, the first civil lawyer, which is different than the second civil lawyer, so if I could just deal with those two topics because I do think that we could debate about value of the loss, but I think you've heard it 25 times or 125 times, but I do think in this particular case, facing this guideline calculation, you know, of offense level 24, this is 51 months, and I realize it's \$2.7 million, but 51 months is a, you know, is a large number, okay, for something like this where, in many ways, you can't even understand what happened here.

I mean, I believe there's no question she lost her way, there's no question that moral compass, there's no

question that I agree with Mr. Balthazard that she got caught up in all the stuff, but ask yourself if you've seen in your whole legal experience a fraud case where a woman takes \$2.7 million of clothes and puts it in green bags and puts it in her house and does not sell it until she leaves.

Quite frankly, I have been unable -- I've been in this case I don't how long, I've been unable to figure out the answer to that.

If I could have one minute, your Honor, because I'm cutting, you'll be happy to hear.

Her character and involvement in the community and the friends, you've read the letters.

And, of course, she cooperated with probation as well, she cooperated with the mental health examiner from probation as well. I've discussed the civil suit.

I think you already know from the probation report her basic character, and, you know, you have the letters in the back that show how generous and caregiving that she is, and it's hard to explain.

When she left Bierly-Drake, one of the things she was starting to do in February and March is look online for these online prayer groups. I've never heard of them, but apparently they exist, online prayer groups, and during these online prayer groups at the time of lent, there was some consensus on the online groups that you should give up during lent by giving

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things away, and that is the point where she started taking these clothes and going away.

It was basically 100 percent of the clothes she took, she gave away 50 percent, 25 percent went to consignment shops, a lot of which came back to the FBI, and the FBI, I think, picked up about 25 percent at the house.

Now, I agree with Mr. Balthazard, I really do, I agree with Mr. Balthazard that on the identity theft to me is just, you know, we pled to it, okay, so it's not one of these situations where we pled to it, however, it's not a crime, that's not what was said. We pled to it, period.

The only thing I wanted to raise, and maybe it's just because it makes me happy to raise it, and that is that this policy was not around since Sessions' memo in this office until this case, I believe we were the first or the second. There's nothing Mr. Balthazard can do about it. There's nothing he can do about it at all, and someone some day may argue that the conduct in this case doesn't really fall within the statute, but, you know, we had to just get through the case, and that is what we had to do.

So on the issue of -- just let me one second because I've gone out of order, and I think that I've done cooperation, so that ends that. I hate to impose upon your Honor, but I'm trying to shorten this thing down.

I'd like to ask you to consider the loss of the value

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argument, which we just touched upon briefly again, and I know that the, you know, you've heard other lawyers like me talk about the fact of, you know, more than half of the cases since 2003 have gone below the guidelines on this issue, and I do know you probably heard the American Bar Association has raised issues with respect to this so-called shadow guidelines, which, again, I think overstates, you know, the enhancement.

And so I think -- give me one second here. I just think on this cooperation thing, I think when there's an FBI raid and you call up and say I want to bring my client in, Mr. Assistant U.S. Attorney, and bring your client in, your client admits the conduct and said, you know, this is how I did it.

I mean, I don't think you have to bring in a little index card with bold letters that say I'm sorry, you know, I don't think you have to come in with an index card in red that says I'm guilty, I mean, you come in and you just say, you know, I did it, and I'm going to cooperate, and when you're talking about this civil case, and I have great respect, as I said, for Mr.

But you talk about this, we sat there for eight hours admitting what we did and trying to help him, and I suppose if I knew that he was going to say this today, I would have brought a big poster in the room and had her read the poster that says I'm very, very sorry, that she does the five-hour

deposition.

So I think that basically, your Honor, I have little to add. As I said before, my client simply lost her way, in my judgment, part of this, just the motive to me remains a mystery. The moral compass that guided her conduct up to 51 years of age was simply set aside; however, she now faces your judgment with the hope that this presentation will set a framework for your mercy. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Balthazard, do you want to respond?

MR. BALTHAZARD: Just with respect to the cooperation, there was no -- nothing that amounts to substantial assistance, and, in fact, my memory is that Mr. Dwyer and his partner came in, spent some time with us, presented a number of areas where she might provide assistance. None of it was any interest, all would have relied simply on Ms. Mulloy's say-so, which she had no credibility, and nothing came of any of it.

I can't speak at all to what efforts were made with respect to the civil case. That was news to me until yesterday or the day before that there had been a deposition, and, again, my understanding is she was ordered, there was a Court Order that she come in and be deposed, and that she — whether it was an order or a subpoena, but that she did come in. She didn't take The Fifth, she answered questions. What may come of it, I have no idea. I think that's really it, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Mulloy, do you wish to address the Court before I impose sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not sure where to begin except maybe to acknowledge what other people have said that this is a somewhat bizarre crime. I'm not sure I understand what went on here or what its purpose was, but the crime was submitted, nonetheless.

Whether it was agreed or revenge or something else, she did commit the crime. Whether other -- whether boutique owners or other people in some way facilitated it is not really before me. The crime was committed, and it's not an impulsive crime, by any stretch of the imagination. It was a calculated series of acts, repeated acts of theft over many years, in violation of a position of private trust with a man, who although she claims was abusive to her thought highly enough of her to not only give her opportunities but to actually name her as the beneficiary of his will.

The great majority of the people I sentence had horrible background in some form or another, they were crack babies, their mothers were prostitutes, their fathers abandoned them, they grew up in poverty and violence in Central America or the South Bronx or stories like that that are heart-breaking. That's not the situation here. There's nothing of that sort in the defendant's background. In fact,

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she appears to have grown up in a loving and supportive home.

She wasn't a drug addict. A lot of crimes, of course, are motivated by addiction, and we don't have that here. I don't know what the psychology of any of this is, but I don't have a psychiatric report. I'm not going to speculate that she has one disorder or another.

As far as the evidence of her remorse, I have to say
I'm having trouble seeing it, even if she did agree to be
deposed in the civil litigation, which is good, it's a positive
factor, but, again, I don't see any expression of sorrow,
sadness, remorse, the kinds of things one would hope to see
under the circumstances.

I agree with the proposition that it looks like she stopped because she was likely to get caught, and then she set about destroying various books and records of the crime to make matters worse.

As to a couple arguments that were made in terms of whether loss is the right measure here, putting aside how it impacts the guidelines, I think the loss is exactly the right measure here.

Sometimes loss and gain don't aid up. You could have someone who steals \$10,000 and destroys a \$10 million company. That's not what happened here, or sometimes you have stock fluctuations or real estate valuations that go up and down or whatever, and things somehow get out of whack, but she decided

exactly how much she stole, and that's the measure of her crime, and, again, it wasn't an impulse, it wasn't just what happened to be in the cash register or the safe that day, she she knew what she was stealing when she stole it.

As to the aggravated identity theft, I'm not by any means a fan of this statute, which, of course, ties my hands to some extent. I don't like mandatory sentencing statutes, and this is a consecutive mandatory statute.

I would be delighted if it were repealed or delighted if it weren't charged, but it is charged, she pleaded guilty, and I have to live with what the statute says, and Congress pretty clearly, for whatever reason, has concluded that it needs to be a two-year mandatory consecutive sentence, and I've been forced to impose it under circumstances that were much more sympathetic than this.

So where does all that take me? The government is recommending a 75-month sentence, 51 months being the bottom of the guidelines, as I've calculated them, plus 24 for the mandatory two-year consecutive sentence.

What I'm going to do is this, and it's a little more than an act of mercy. I'm going to take some time off that.

I'm going to give her a sentence of 69 months, which is 45 months plus 24. It's a significant sentence for someone of her age with no criminal record. It is more than five years in prison, which I think is enough to make the point under the

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1 circumstances.

I don't mean by doing that to suggest in any way that she's not entirely deserving of that sentence, and she's probably deserving of much more, but I think that's what the appropriate sentence is under the circumstances.

I will, of course, impose a restitution order and a three-year term of supervised release. And, again, there was a good argument that she deserves a longer sentence than that, but that is the sentence that I will impose.

All right. My practice, as you probably know, is to state the sentence that I'm going to impose followed by a formal statement of the reasons for the sentence if I haven't done so already, after which I'll give counsel an opportunity to make a final set of objections or corrections.

Mr. Dwyer, do you have any recommendations you'd like me to make concerning the place of her incarceration or anything of that sort?

MR. DWYER: Danbury, please, FCI-Danbury and a self-report date that's, I don't know, we can set a date here, but whether or not we have to wait but a self-report date at the end of January possibly.

THE COURT: What is the government's view of self-reporting?

MR. BALTHAZARD: The government has no objection, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Would the defendant please stand. Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and having considered the sentencing factors set forth at 18 United States Code, Section 3553(a), it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant, Debra Mulloy, is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 69 months.

The Court makes a judicial recommendation that she serve her term of incarceration at FCI-Danbury or at another suitable facility as close as possible to Massachusetts.

The prison term consists of terms of 45 months on Counts 1 and 2 to be served concurrently and a term of 24 months on Count 3 to be served consecutively to the terms imposed on the other counts.

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of three years. This term consists of terms of three years on Counts 1 and 2 and one year on Count 3, such terms to run concurrently.

Within 72 hours of release from custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the defendant shall report in person to the district to which she is released.

It is further ordered as a condition of supervised release that she make restitution in the amount \$2,654,346.95 to Bierly-Drake Associates, Inc., care of their counsel, William Sinnott.

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Payment of the restitution shall begin immediately according to a Court-ordered repayment schedule. I'm sorry, payment of the restitution shall begin immediately according to the requirements of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' inmate financial responsibility program while incarcerated and according to a Court-ordered repayment schedule during the term of supervised release.

All restitution payments shall made to the clerk,

U.S. District Court for transfer to the identified victim. The

defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this

district within 30 days of any change of mailing or residence

address that occurs while any portion of the restitution

remains unpaid.

Is there a live forfeiture issue, Mr. Balthazard?

MR. BALTHAZARD: There is not, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. While on supervised release, the defendant shall comply with the following terms and conditions:

She must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

She must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

I'm going to suspend drug testing conditions based on my determination that she poses a low risk of future substance abuse.

She must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by probation.

She shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by the Court, which are set forth at Section 5D1.3C of the Sentencing Guidelines, and which will be set forth in detail in the judgment.

She's prohibited from engaging in an occupation, business or profession in the financial field that would require or enable her to have access to other people's financial information.

She must participate in a mental health treatment program as directed by probation.

She must pay the balance of any restitution imposed according to a Court-ordered repayment schedule.

She's prohibited from incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval of probation while any financial obligations remain outstanding.

You must provide the probation office access to any requested financial information, which may be shared with the financial litigation unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office, and she'll be required to contribute to the costs of evaluation, treatment, programming, and/or monitoring based on the ability to pay or availability of third-party payment, and it is further ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of \$300, which shall be due

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1 immediately.

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All right. You may be seated. In terms of the formal reasons for the sentence, it's a nonguideline sentence imposed under Section 3553(a) for the reasons indicated.

The terms of supervised releases I think are appropriate to ensure adequate supervision and to ascertain the defendant's ability to make restitution payments.

I'm imposing no fine because to the extent the defendant has any financial assets, they should go to the victim and not to the Federal Government, and the special assessment is, of course, mandatory.

Do counsel have any addition or correction or objection to that sentence not previously stated?

MR. DWYER: No, your Honor.

MR. BALTHAZARD: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The sentence is imposed as stated. I will order that she self-surrender at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons six weeks from today, and I believe there was a waiver of appeal; am I right?

MR. BALTHAZARD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Mulloy, I understand from the plea agreement that you've waived your right to appeal your conviction and sentence; nonetheless, I'm going to advise you of your right to appeal. I don't mean to confuse you. I'm doing it as a precaution in case for some reason your waiver of

1 rights does not apply or is not effective, and you'll have to consult with your counsel to see whether or not that is true. 2 If you have not waived it, you may be able to appeal 3 your conviction if you believe that your quilty plea was 4 5 unlawful or involuntary, or if there was some other fundamental 6 defect in the proceeding that you have not waived. You may have the right to appeal your sentence under 7 some circumstances, particularly if you think the sentence was 8 9 contrary to law. 10 If you're unable to pay the costs of appeal, you may 11 ask permission to have those costs waived and appeal without 12 pain. You must file any notice of appeal within 14 days after 13 the entry of judgment, and if you request, the clerk will 14 immediately prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf. And, again, I understand that you have waived your 15 16 right to appeal. 17 MR. DWYER: That's correct, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further, Mr. Balthazard? 19 04:05PM 20 MR. BALTHAZARD: No, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Dwyer. 22 MR. DWYER: No, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Before we break, Mr. 24 want to indicate that my heart certainly goes out to you, and I

wish you well in your recovery to the extent that you can

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recover from this set of events. All right. Thank you.
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               THE CLERK: All rise.
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               (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 4:05 p.m.)
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                              CERTIFICATE
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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
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      DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ) ss.
      CITY OF BOSTON )
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                I do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript,
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      Pages 1 through 40 inclusive, was recorded by me
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      stenographically at the time and place aforesaid in Criminal
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      Action No. 18-10200-FDS, UNITED STATES of AMERICA vs.
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      DEBRA MULLOY and thereafter by me reduced to typewriting and is
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      a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
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                Dated this October 7, 2019.
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                              s/s Valerie A. O'Hara
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                               VALERIE A. O'HARA
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                               OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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